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ABSTRACT 
 
When Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, was first interviewed after 
September 11, 2001, a tragedy that devastated his firm and stole the life of his brother, 
Lutnick stated that he now had “700 families to feed.”  The view that he expressed was 
that his firm was responsible to the families of the wage earners lost in the tragedy, even 
though the firm was not responsible for the events that had occurred.  Such assumed 
corporate responsibility, consistent with a stakeholder-based approach to management, is 
often considered to conflict with the law.  The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate 
that stakeholder management does not inherently conflict with the law.  In fact, principles 
of stakeholder thinking coincide with our moral intuitions, reflect many demonstrated 
best business practices, and promote profit-generation as envisioned and advocated by the 
law.  This Article explores the nature of stakeholder relationships and their impact on 
business enterprises.  The interconnected experiences of individuals and organizations in 
the wake of the events of September 11, while exemplary and perhaps more pronounced, 
are not isolated.  The purpose of this Article is to draw upon such experiences in order to 
move beyond the traditional hub-and-spoke model of the firm, and to integrate past and 
present examples in a more dynamic, stakeholder-based model of corporate citizenship 
that bridges the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law and is both descriptive and 
normative. 
 
Keywords: World Trade Center, Peace, Stakeholder thinking, Stakeholder theory, 
Citizenship, Corporate citizenship, Fiduciary law, Milton Friedman, Corporate social 
responsibilities, Social responsibilities, Stockholder theory, Stockholders, Stakeholders, 
Constituency statutesWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION:  CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
When Howard Lutnick, CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, was first interviewed after 
September 11, 2001, a tragedy that devastated his firm and stole the life of his brother, 
Lutnick stated thathe now had “700 families to feed.”  The view that he expressed was 
that his firm was responsible to the families of the wage earners lost in the tragedy, even 
though the firm was not responsible for the events that had occurred.  Such assumed 
corporate responsibility, consistent with a stakeholder-based approach to management, is 
often considered to conflict with the law.  The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate 
that stakeholder management does not inherently conflict with the law.  In fact, principles 
of stakeholder thinking coincide with our moral intuitions, reflect many demonstrated 
best business practices, and promote profit-generation as envisioned and advocated by the 
law.  This Article explores the nature of stakeholder relationships and their impact on 
business enterprises.  The interconnected experiences of individuals and organizations in 
the wake of the events of September 11, while exemplary and perhaps more pronounced, 
are not isolated.  The purpose of this Article is to draw upon such experiences in order to 
move beyond the traditional hub-and-spoke model of the firm, and to integrate past and 
present examples in a more dynamic, stakeholder-based model of corporate citizenship 
that bridges the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law and is both descriptive and 
normative. 
As global politics and business have become increasingly intertwined, as 
evidenced by the virtually unprecedented, politically motivated assault on capitalism that 
took place on September 11, questions relating to sustainable peace are being discussed William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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in new contexts such as business.
1  Business enterprises are no longer isolated or immune 
to global politics.  Although business scholarship has not traditionally tackled questions 
of sustainable peace in any depth, “This does not mean, of course,” as Jeffrey Nesteruk 
has noted, “that such an inquiry is an inappropriate one.  Posing new questions is one of 
the central roles of legal theory.  Even when the outcome of such inquiries is uncertain, 
asking novel questions can be fruitful, sometimes in unforeseen ways.”
2  One question 
that immediately comes to mind is, if business is linked to sustainable peace, as is 
perhaps demonstrated by the attack on the World Trade Center, how does this influence 
our understanding of business? 
In the wake of September 11, dialogue regarding the relationship between 
business enterprises and sustainable peace has become a springboard topic for us to 
consider how our business models and legal principles can be integrated into stronger 
descriptive models with both normative and instrumental implications.
3  Stakeholder 
thinking provides a useful lens through which to view business enterprises, particularly in 
terms of engagement, development, and recovery.
4  In exploring the role of business 
                                                 
1 E. W. Orts, War and the Business Corporation, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 389 (2002).  “[T]he topic of war 
… is not ordinarily considered germane to academic studies of corporate law.”  Id. at 550. 
2 “While there is a rich literature exploring corporate social responsibility, the role of the corporation in 
promoting peace has not been the focus of scholarly inquiry.”  J. Nesteruk, Conceptions of the Corporation 
and the Prospects of Sustainable Peace, 35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 437 (2002). 
3 As stakeholder thinking has developed, its nature (i.e., descriptive, normative, and/or instrumental) has 
been widely discussed and debate.  See T. Donaldson and L. E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation:  Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 21 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 65 (1995).  For development of 
particular dimensions, see, for example, T. M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory:  A Synthesis of 
Ethics and Economics, 20 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 404 ; K. Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 
J. Bus. Ethics 245 (2000); R. E. Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory:  Some Future Directions, 4 
Bus. Ethics Q. 409 (1994). 
4 It can be argued that capitalism has a moral component.  A number of scholars have explored the 
connection between capitalism and morality.  See, for example, N. E. Bowie, A Kantian Theory of 
Capitalism, Special Issue #1 Bus. Ethics Q., Ruffin Series 37 (1994); T. L. Fort and C. A. Schipani, 
Corporate Governance in a Global Environment:  The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 829 (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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enterprises in contributing to sustainable peace, this Article offers a stakeholder-based 
approach as a viable metaphor for business.
5 
Although stakeholder thinking has frequently been construed to be in conflict 
with the legal principle of shareholder primacy,
6 there are indications that stakeholder 
thinking does not inherently conflict with the law.
7  The purpose of corporate law is to 
protect the investment of shareholders and to guard their potential profits.  Stakeholder 
thinking does not inherently challenge the rights of shareholders as residual claimants.
8  
On the contrary, arguments in favor of stakeholder management hold that stakeholders in 
general, including shareholders, benefit from such an approach. 
This first section of this Article deals with stakeholder theory and the law.  It 
begins by confronting and resolving perceived conflicts between stakeholder thinking and 
the law.  In Part I, this Article explores the role of law with regard to business enterprises 
such as corporations.  The Article outlines the legal context and environment in which 
business enterprises operate and traces the rise of shareholder primacy.  Part II then 
presents an overview of the development of thinking during the past 20 years, beginning 
with the 1984 publication of R. Edward Freeman’s Strategic Management:  A 
Stakeholder Approach.
9  This is followed by Part III, which endeavors to bridge the gap 
                                                 
5 There are several alternative metaphors for business.  T. L. Fort and J. J. Noone, Banded Contracts, 
Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance:  A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the 
Firm, 62 Law & Contemp. Prob. 163 (1999). 
6 See, e.g., K. B. Davis, Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder 
Gain—A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 Can.-U.S. L. J. (1988).  According to 
Davis, “The bedrock principle of U.S. corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the 
polestar of managerial decisionmaking.”  Id. at 8. 
7 D. G. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 277 (1998). 
8 For a discussion about residual claimants, see L. A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (2002). 
9 R. E. Freeman, Strategic Management:  A Stakeholder Approach (1984). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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between stakeholder thinking and the law and reveal that stakeholder thinking is 
consistent with and supportive of legal principles. 
The second section of this Article endeavors to illustrate how stakeholder thinking 
leads to principles of corporate citizenship, and how corporate citizenship reveals roles 
for business enterprises and their stakeholders in contributing to sustainable peace.  The 
story of the September 11 devastation of the World Trade Center in New York is then 
retold in Part IV.
10  Business ethics relies on storytelling to create connections between 
people and to provide models for behavior.
11  In this instance, the story is not of a single 
business enterprise, but of a community of business enterprises and stakeholders.  
Essential to this story are the roles of networks of stakeholder relationships in 
contributing to the recovery and rebuilding of downtown New York.  In Part V, the 
Article connects lessons from September 11 to a broader model of corporate citizenship.  
Emphasis is placed on the movement toward a relational model, as opposed to the 
traditional hub-and-spoke model originally proposed by Freeman.  Current approaches to 
stakeholder thinking have shifted the focus from the individual stakeholders to the 
interconnected stakeholder relationships that underlie and influence business enterprises.  
Finally, in Part VI, the Article concludes by linking corporate citizenship to sustainable 
peace.  Business enterprises play an integral role in sustainable peace through their 
participation in the stakeholder networks that underlie their organizations and society in 
general. 
                                                 
10 The purpose of this Article is not to ignore the other tragedies of September 11, including the plane 
crashes in Washington, D.C., and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or to suggest in any way that they were not 
similarly horrific.  Since this Article is not about terrorism in general, though, it focuses primarily on the 
impact of the events of September 11 on business enterprises in New York and their stakeholders. 
11 There is considerable support within business ethics scholarship for the development of storytelling and 
metaphors as teaching and learning tools.  See, for example, A. C. Wicks, D. R. Gilbert and R. E. Freeman, 
A Feminist Reinterpretation of the Stakeholder Concept, 4 Bus. Ethics Q. 475 (1994). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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 PART I:  LEGAL TREATMENT OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 
  In order to determine both the contribution and controversy of stakeholder 
thinking, it is important to view it within the context of the legal environment for 
business enterprises.  In many ways, the treatment of business enterprises by the law has 
stemmed from their artificiality.  Business entities are inherently “fictitious.”  State codes 
structure their incorporation and existence.
12  These codes provide for the issuance of 
stock to shareholders, who are considered the owners of the entities.
13  Managers are then 
designated to control operations in their interests.  The relationship between managers 
and shareholders is considered fiduciary in nature.  This has given rise to the notion of 
shareholder primacy—that managers are expected to pursue profit maximization.  
Economic thinking has also become increasingly popular within legal scholarship and 
jurisprudence. 
  While this is not necessarily true in other countries, where the legal infrastructure 
supports attention to a variety of stakeholders,
14 the tradition in the United States has been 
to assume that non-shareholder stakeholders are without rights.  In fact, this is not 
entirely true.  While non-shareholder stakeholders are given general protection, there is 
abundant legislation that specifies situations where stakeholder concerns actually trump 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of state control over corporations, see A. F. Conard, Corporations in Perspective (1976).  
According to Conard, it is a natural consequence of federalism.  “[T]he effect of [the Constitution’s] saying 
nothing,” Conard asserted, “was to permit the states to continue granting corporate status under the doctrine 
of reserved powers.”  Id. at 6.  Gregory A. Mark has argued that Conrad’s account is overly simplistic.  
Mechanically, it is true that the doctrine of reserved powers legitimizes state control.  There was, though, 
more going on “behind the scenes,” so to speak.  According to Mark, the system we have ended up with is 
not the natural result of federalism, but, in actuality, nothing more than an “accident” resulting from a web 
of contradictory and complementary “phenomena.”  G. A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation:  
Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 403 (1997), 406. 
13 For a general discussion that traces the development of corporate law and governance in the United 
States, see J. W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States:  1780-
1970 (1970).  See also J. S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (1917). 
14 C. A. Schipani and J. Liu, Corporate Governance in China:  Then and Now, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1 
(2002). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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shareholder concerns.
15  In addition, fiduciary law does not preclude managerial 
responsibilities to other stakeholders as well.  In fact, convincing arguments can be and 
have been made that attention to multiple stakeholders can actually enhance overall 
profitability in the long term if not the short term as well.
16 
  Legal treatment of shareholders and other stakeholders is influenced by a number 
of factors.  The state codes that structure corporate organizations play a foundational role, 
as does our understanding and interpretation of fiduciary law.  State and federal 
legislation and common law also serve to protect fundamental rights of general 
stakeholders.  In addition, legal treatment of stakeholders is also heavily influenced by 
basic understandings of the role of the corporation, as explored, for example, through 
alternative theories of the firm.  Economic interpretations of the firm have tended to 
myopically endorse shareholder primacy without regard for other stakeholders.  Broader 
interpretations of the firm, which incorporate both its historical development and its 
increasingly expansive role in society, tend to allow for attention to the concerns of 
shareholders and other stakeholders.  
 
A.  Theories of the Firm 
Theories of the firm—why it exists and what its nature is—have fascinated 
scholars, practitioners, and jurists for the past two centuries.  They have explored the 
philosophical, social, political, and economic dimensions of corporate theory in a way 
                                                 
15 See, for example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
16 Although arguments have been made that managerial responsibilities to stakeholders are multifiduciary 
in nature, that is not the argument here.  See, for example, R. E. Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder 
Theory:  Some Future Directions, 4 Bus. Ethics Q. 409 (1994). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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that has proved both engaging and provocative.
17  Interestingly, no single, authoritative, 
comprehensive account of the corporation has emerged.  Instead, multiple theories 
coexist.  It does appear, though, that contractual views of the corporation are particularly 
popular within the legal community.
18 
It is important to place this within the context of the historical development of 
corporations.  The corporate form was created by law, and then the theories developed 
retrospectively.  Interestingly, many of the theories overlook the roots of the corporate 
form.  While the corporation has become perceived as profit-generation tool for 
individuals, this is not actually how corporations were initially envisioned.  Most of the 
early corporations were public utilities, and the corporate form was created to promote 
such services. 
Morton J. Horwitz is credited with one of the more accepted accounts of the 
theories of the corporation.  He contends that theory development has often actually 
followed case decisions.  In his opinion, leading cases, such as Santa Clara Co. v. 
Southen Pacific Railroad, were not necessarily based on particular theories of the firm, 
but actually anticipated the theories they have been used to support.
19 
In “Santa Clara Revisited:  The Development of Corporate Theory,” he addressed 
the intellectual climate during various time periods in American history.  Horwitz offered 
                                                 
17 D. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201 (1990).  “While apparently metaphysical 
questions about ‘the nature of the corporation’ might strike one as vaguely continental and surely alien to 
our hard-headed, pragmatic legal culture, theorizing about ‘what corporations are’ has in fact occupied a 
great deal of home-grown mental energy and has played an important role in arguments about concrete 
questions of corporate law.” 
18 Contractual theories of the firm have also emerged as significant within the field of business ethics.  See, 
for example, T. Donaldson and T. W. Dunfee, Ties That Bind:  A Social Contracts Approach to Business 
Ethics (1999). 
19 Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886):  “The court does not wish to hear 
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these 
corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does” (396). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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his interpretation of the doctrinal origins of theories of the corporation through a step-by-
step history of the evolution of the traditional theories of the corporation.
20  He tackled 
the puzzling and complex Santa Clara case, and demonstrated how it has been 
misinterpreted.
21  Whereas it has often been credited with the birth of the natural entity 
theory, Horwitz asserted that it was roughly a decade after the Santa Clara decision 
before the natural entity theory emerged, and it was only then that Santa Clara began to 
stand for the establishment of dramatically new constitutional protections for 
corporations as a result of their “legal personhood.”
22  Numerous authors have 
subsequently relied upon Horwitz’s account as they explored traditional theories further 
and delved into modern theories.
23 
While Horwitz’s approach has proved useful in many ways, it suggests that the 
theories are temporally based, which is not entirely correct.  The emergence of new 
theories has not caused the complete reversal of older theories.  David Million has 
suggested that theories of the corporation can also be viewed according to the questions 
they confront.
24 
It can be argued that there are two general groups of theories of the corporation:  
the traditional theories and the modern theories.  What distinguishes these theories is their 
                                                 
20 M. J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:  The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173 
(1985). 
21 “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does” Santa Clara Co., 
supra note 49, at 396. 
22 Horwitz, supra note 20.  “[T]he so-called ‘natural entity’ or ‘real entity’ theory of the corporation that the 
Santa Clara case is supposed to have adopted was nowhere to be found in American legal thought when 
the case was decided,” Horwitz explains.  “[T]hose who argued for the corporations as well as Supreme 
Court Justice Stephen Field, who decided in favor of the corporation in two elaborate circuit court opinions 
below, clearly had no conception of a natural entity theory of the corporation.” 
23 See, for example, Millon, supra note 17. 
24 Id. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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reliance on economic thought.  There has always been controversy regarding the 
theoretical foundation for the corporation.  Prior to the early 1900s, the focal points 
surrounded the philosophical, social, and political dimensions of the corporation.  Then, 
in the early part of this century, a school of thought, called “law and economics,” began 
to develop, which challenged traditional thinking.  Accompanying this new school of 
thought were new theories of the firm.  Modern economic theories of the corporation thus 
emerged that marked a radical departure from traditional thinking.  The concerns that 
were most prominent in traditional theories are virtually inconsequential according to 
modern theories. 
Traditional theories can be characterized by their focus on a certain set of 
interesting questions.  According to these theories, it is the philosophical, social, and 
political dimensions of the corporation that serve to fuel the controversy:  whether the 
corporation is natural or artificial, whether it is a separate entity or an aggregate, and 
whether it represents a public or private concern.  One subset of the traditional theories 
questions the relationship between the corporation and law.  Some people argue that the 
corporation is primarily a legal classification, whereas others contend that is rooted in 
private ventures unconnected to the law.  Another subset aims toward defining what the 
corporation actually is.  There is a view that the corporation develops into an entity of its 
own, separate from its members (such as shareholders).
25  Competing with this is the 
                                                 
25 This is the “natural entity” theory of the firm.  According to this view, the corporation is a natural entity, 
whose existence is defined by law, which exists as more than an artificial endeavor.  Corporations engage 
in real activities with real consequences.  Whereas “incorporation,” the process through which a 
corporation is officially formed, is a legal process, the firm operating as a “corporation” establishes a 
presence in society and in the local community that often extends far beyond what the legal definition 
indicates.  The argument is thus that corporations are “real” entities, which, regardless of their “fictitious” 
roots, develop independent identities that position them as legal “persons.”  Conard, supra note 12. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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view that the corporation is merely the aggregate of its members.
26  A third subset 
challenges the public/private distinction.  People who consider the corporation a “public” 
entity tend to acknowledge an array of rights and responsibilities (often dubbed “social” 
responsibilities) that people who consider the corporation a “private” entity tend to 
ignore.  Whereas the first two types of theories explore the nature of the corporation, the 
third type attempts to determine the nature of corporate activity—what is appropriate or 
legitimate, and what is not.
27 
 
B.  Law and Economics 
Economic thinking has proved influential on the development of jurisprudence.  
The foundation of the legal approach to corporations is often traced back to the 1932 
publication of The Modern Corporation and Public Property.  In their seminal book, 
Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means underscore the problems that emerge as a result of 
the separation of ownership and control between corporate shareholder investors and 
corporate managers.
28  Self-dealing, for example, is an ongoing concern.  In other words, 
since the managers are in charge of other people’s money, it is important that they make 
decisions based on what is best for the investors, not themselves.  Berle and Means have 
                                                 
26 The hallmark of this, the “aggregate entity” theory, is its refusal to admit the existence of a distinct 
corporate entity, except, perhaps, for that created by law.  Robert Hessen, for example, contends that “[a] 
group or association is only a concept, a mental construct, used to classify different types of relationships 
between individuals.”  R. Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation (1979), 41.  According to the “aggregate 
entity” theory, the corporation is merely the sum of its parts—nothing more, nothing less.  Clearly, 
according to Michael Phillips, “If corporations are creatures of state law and nothing else, they almost 
certainly must be artificial, invisible, intangible, and fictional.”  M. J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity 
Theory of the Corporation, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1061 (1994), 1064. 
27 The fact that rights are attributed to the corporation as a separate entity, coupled with the growing body 
of corporate law, dedicated to the regulation of the corporate entity, serves to enhance the perception of the 
corporation as a “real entity.”  This is the “real entity” theory of the corporation.  Id. 
28 A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1968). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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thus opened the door to waves of literature exploring the ramifications of this separation, 
for shareholders, managers, and the corporation in general.
29 
At about the same time, economist Ronald Coase began an inquiry into the nature 
of the firm enterprise.  His article, “The Nature of the Firm,” published in 1937, called 
into question many of the assumptions of traditional economics, and suggested that the 
focus on external market transactions was misplaced.
30  According to Coase, it is the 
pricing mechanism associated with internal transactions that leads to the creation of 
firms.  In other words, firms exist because it is more cost effective to combine efforts 
through a firm than to contract separately for everything.
31 
Economists since Coase have tended to lean toward one of two separate analytic 
traditions.  Those following Coase, the “bargain model” theorists, assume the virtual 
absence of transaction costs in order explore the significance of different legal rules.
32  It 
                                                 
29 The legal system plays an important role, according to Berle and Means, for both government and legal 
intervention are necessary in order to control the potential indiscretion of managers.  More than 50 years 
after they first articulated their concerns, the legal theory that governs shareholder/manager relations, 
fiduciary law, is essentially the type of theory that Berle and Means call for.  It emphasizes the private 
property interests of the shareholder investors, and asserts that the managers are obliged by law to protect 
those interests. 
30 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).  See also R. H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1961). 
31 Coase steals from us the refuge of traditional “fairness” and causation in dealing with conflicts that arise.  
He instead leaves us to look for the “cheapest cost avoider.”  It does not matter, according to Coase, who is 
culpable.  Instead, he focuses on how the situation can most easily be rectified.  The goal is to have parties 
bargain between themselves. They are best situated to value their own benefits and harms and reach a 
compromise to at least mitigate some of the resulting harm.  In many cases, the court recognizes the 
reciprocal nature of the problem—that both parties are in risk of harm—and, at least at times, will place the 
burden of liability upon the party that is in the best position to afford it, to encourage that party to bargain 
with the other party. 
32 See, for example See, for example, A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972).  Although Alchian and Demsetz follow in the 
tradition of Coase in their questioning of traditional assumptions about the nature of the firm, they 
challenge his contention that the price mechanism and competition were characteristics present in markets 
but not in firms.  They do not see meaningful differences between intra-firm and extra-firm economic 
principles.  They therefore paint a picture of the firm that draws parallels between what Coase sees outside 
the firm and what they see inside.  Alchian and Demsetz argue that the firm, itself, has no separate 
existence.  Corporations have “no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action.”  Parties are 
considered rational, self-interested economic actors, who often exhibit conflicting interests, even though all William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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is the interplay of the rules in the initial bargaining environment that intrigues these 
theorists.
33  The “transaction cost” theorists, on the other hand, are concerned with the 
initial bargaining environment itself.  It is their contention that it is not possible to 
allocate all possible risks at the time of contracting.
34  Their goal lies in the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                                                 
parties are considered to be motivated by the pursuit of wealth maximization.  The contracts between these 
parties represent instantaneous exchanges that are the result of choice and compromise, in the face of both 
competition and relative uncertainty.  Alchian and Demsetz have thus been credited with laying the 
foundation upon which the notion of a managerial corporation has been built.  They are considered to have 
originated the view of the corporation as a “nexus of contracts.”  See also W. W. Bratton, Jr., The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989); J. H. 
Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal. Stud. 277 (1972); A. T. 
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978); Priest, 
Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code:  An 
Economic Approach, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 960 (1978); Commentaries on Corporate Structure and Governance, 
in (D. E. Schwartz ed., 1979). 
33 See M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).  While Alchian and Demsetz model applies to private 
ownership, the Jensen and Demsetz identify the consequences of public ownership.  In addition, whereas 
Alchian and Demsetz explore the nature of management, Jensen and Meckling focus on corporate 
governance and emphasize the financial implications of firm operations.  Jensen and Meckling introduced 
the financial model that has provided the basis for further development of “law and economics” and the 
contractual theory of the corporation.  They argue that the external dynamics of firm activities are similar to 
the firm’s internal dynamics.  Jensen and Meckling contend that managers serve as agents for the 
shareholders.  They are thus responsible for making decisions that have direct consequences on the 
shareholders’ interests.  Unity of control and ownership is not necessary for efficient and effective firm 
performance, according to Jensen and Meckling.  See also H. N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the 
Firm, 11 Geo. Mason U.L. Rev. 99 (1989), 108. 
34 See F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 (1989); F. H. 
Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991).  Easterbrook and Fischel 
have been lauded as the foremost architects of the contractual interpretation of the corporation.  See W. W. 
Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. Rev. 180 (1992).  
Whereas those before them introduced the “nexus of contract” idea, they are responsible for laying out the 
particulars of a contractual approach to contract law, first in their 1989 article, “The Corporate Contract,” 
followed subsequently by their more comprehensive 1992 book, The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law.  Easterbrook and Fischel underscore the contract metaphor as a new way of analyzing corporations 
and corporate law.  They argue that corporations, a subset of firms, represent a myriad of freely bargained 
contractual arrangements.  They are careful, in using such a metaphor, though, to distinguish the corporate 
view of contract from other views, such as the political view.  “We often speak of the corporation as a 
‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts,” Easterbrook and Fischel assert.  “This 
reference, too, is shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate 
voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves.  The form of reference is a reminder that 
the corporation is a voluntary adventure, and that we must always examine the terms on which real people 
have agreed to participate.”  According to Easterbrook and Fischel, what distinguishes corporate contracts, 
and the contract theory as applied to corporations, is that corporate contracts are real.  “The corporate 
venture has many real contracts,” they explain.  “The terms present in the articles of incorporation at the 
time the firm is established or issues stock are real agreements.  Everything to do with the relation between 
the firm and the suppliers of labor (employees), goods and services (suppliers and contractors) is 
contractual.”  The contribution of Easterbrook and Fischel has thus been fundamental.  They join two William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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ways to reduce the transaction costs in complex contraction relationships (i.e., relational 
contracts).
35 
While these approaches are admittedly different, together they comprise the 
bringing together of law and economics in a way traditionally considered inappropriate.  
Whereas law and economics have traditionally been considered at odds, the field of “law 
and economics,” which has gained increasing acceptance during the past few decades, 
has set a new course for a great deal of legal scholarship and decision-making.  It has laid 
the foundation for a new, contractually based, economic theory of the corporation, which 
has, in turn, influenced both legislation and jurisprudence. 
 
C.  Fiduciary Law and Managerial Decision-Making 
The separation of ownership and control in business enterprises dates back to 
Berle and Means and has lead to the development of fiduciary law.
36  Since managers 
                                                                                                                                                 
previously disparate fields—law and economics—in a way that has proved influential in both legal analysis 
and legal construction.  They do not entirely supplant corporate law, but they do redefine its scope, for, 
according to Easterbrook and Fischel, “The corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, 
and corporate law enables the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of 
risks and opportunities that are available in a large economy.”  Easterbrook and Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 1418. 
35 See, for example, V. P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 
426 (1976); I. R. Macneil, Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); O. E. Williamson, The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism:  Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (1987).  See C. J. Goetz and 
R. E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981).  According to the traditional 
model of contracts, people engage in contractual relationships in order to benefit from mutual cooperation.  
They make exchanges, of products or services, for example, in order for mutual benefit.  Such exchanges 
are not without expected risks, but those risks are expected and, therefore, assumed to be incorporated into 
the bargaining process—either specifically by the bargaining parties or generally by legal rules or 
prescriptions.  Goetz and Scott argue that there are some types of contractual relationships that are not 
covered by the traditional model.  These contracts, so-called “relational” contracts, are unusual in both their 
duration and degree of interactivity.  This translates into greater uncertainty and unpredictability with 
regard to the risks.  Future contingencies are not easily anticipated.  “Not surprisingly,” Goetz and Scott 
point out, “parties who find it advantageous to enter into such cooperative exchange relationships seek 
specially adapted contractual devices.”  Id. at 1090. 
36 Berle and Means, supra note 28. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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make decisions that affect the profitability of the stock owned by shareholders, managers 
are considered to have fiduciary responsibilities to those shareholders.  Managers are 
expected to make decisions in the interest of shareholders, not for personal gain. 
According to fiduciary law there are certain relationships, based on trust, which 
place one person, or entity, in control over the interests—usually, though not always, 
financial—of another person or entity.
37  These relationships are called “fiduciary” 
relationships.
38  While contracts, or agreements of some sort, often lay the groundwork 
for these sorts of relationships, there is little, if any, direct attention paid to spelling out 
many of the relevant rights and responsibilities.  Fiduciary law operates as something 
“stricter than the morals of the market-place,” said Judge Cardozo in Meinhard v. 
Salmon, because it involves “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”
39 
Fiduciary relationships emerge in situations where financial interests are at stake.  
“The term ‘fiduciary’ itself was adopted to apply to situations falling short of ‘trusts,’ but 
in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee,” explained Deborah A. 
DeMott.
40  In fiduciary relationships, owners of the interests benefit or suffer from the 
consequences of the decisions made by fiduciaries, but remain mere beneficiaries without 
any control over the specific decisions made with regard to their interests.  Fiduciaries are 
not beneficiaries of the interests, or funds, they are charged with protection of another’s 
interests.  As Victor Brudney pointed out, “The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that 
the fiduciary agrees to act as his principal’s alter ego rather than to assume the standard 
arm’s length stance of traders in a market.  Hence the fiduciary is not armed with the 
                                                 
37 For a general overview of fiduciary law, see, for example, G. Hertig, Corporate Governance in the United 
States as Seen from Europe, 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 27 (1998). 
38 See generally, T. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795 (1983). 
39 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) at 546. 
40 D. A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879 (1988). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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usual wariness that one has in dealing with strangers; he trusts the principal to deal with 
him as frankly as he would deal with himself—he has bought candor.”
41  
  In the corporate setting, “fiduciary” is the label often given to the relationship 
between corporate shareowners and the corporation (i.e., officers, directors, and 
managers).
42  People and entities invest in corporate activities through the purchase of 
shares.  Their purchase, or investment, is accompanied by a loss of control, though.  
Although the motivation for such investment is generally profit, there is nothing in the 
purchase agreement that guarantees that the investment will earn a profit.  “Treating 
managers and directors as fiduciaries provides an effective mechanism for imposing 
sanctions when management fails to exercise its responsibilities to the corporation 
properly,” Carol B. Swanson asserted.  “This is tantamount to replacing supervision with 
deterrence.”
43 
  This is where, and why, fiduciary law steps in to govern the relationship.  Duties 
of care and loyalty emerge in the corporate setting as restraints upon managerial 
behavior.  Corporate profits do not belong to the managers—they belong to the 
shareowners.  These duties thus compel managers (1) to conduct business in such as way 
                                                 
41 V. Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595 (1997). 
42 Fiduciary law affords shareholders “fair expectations.”  M. A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation 
Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 (1989).  For a general discussion of fiduciary law as it operates in the 
corporate setting, see L. E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425 (1993).  
43 C. B. Swanson, Corporate Governance:  Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. Corp. L. 
417 (1996).  See also J. C. Coffee, Jr., Court Has a New Idea on Directors’ Duty, Court Has a New Idea on 
Directors’ Duty, Mar. 2, 1992).  The leading decision in Delaware is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (1986).  See also Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.3d 300 (Del. Supr. 
1968); Hartford Fire Ins. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 728 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  Some decisions suggest that directors 
normally own duties to creditors as well as shareholders.  See, for example, Armstrong Manors v. Burns, 
14 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1941); Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, 187 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Cal. App. 1983).  For an 
overview, see W. W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:  Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1989). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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that contributes toward increasing these profits, and (2) not to use corporate profits to 
serve personal purposes, or the purposes of anyone other than shareowners. 
Fiduciary law is currently confronting general challenges regarding whether it 
serves as an appropriate vehicle within the context of corporate law.  Fiduciary law is 
intrinsically linked to notions of morality.  Many contractarians thus argue against the 
continued reliance on fiduciary principles in the corporate setting.  They believe that the 
purpose of corporate law is merely to interpret the underlying contractual relationships 
and enforce them.  “Regarding the fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers to the 
corporation and its investors, it was entirely predictable that the Contractarians advocate 
that society should have no corporate fiduciary principles,” Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., 
explains.  “Rather, the Contractarians argue that we are better off if society stays out of 
the entire matter and leaves private parties (i.e., corporate managers and investors) free to 
contract as they see fit regarding fiduciary duties.”
44  Viewing the role of corporate law in 
such a way renders fiduciary law virtually irrelevant with regard to corporations. 
In spite of questions and criticism from numerous perspectives, fiduciary law 
continues to guide fundamental assumptions about appropriate managerial decision-
making.  It delineates the scope of managers’ relationships with shareholders and assigns 
particular rights and responsibilities that are recognized and enforced by the legal system.  
Fiduciary law does not necessary preclude stakeholder thinking, though, for it can be 
argued that responsible managers pay attention to stakeholder concerns in order to protect 
shareholders.  It is only narrow, myopic interpretations of the fiduciary responsibilities of 
                                                 
44R. B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
561 (1996). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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managers that threaten the ability of business enterprises to fulfill their responsibilities to 
shareholders and other stakeholders as well. 
 
D.  Milton Friedman and Corporate Social Responsibilities 
Although dialogue concerning corporate social responsibilities had existed since 
the earliest corporations emerged in the United States,
45 it was in 1970 that Milton 
Friedman, noted free-market economist, addressed the debate head on and provided on of 
the most often cited references for the shareholder theory of the firm.
46  Shareholder 
primacy is reflected in Friedman’s “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase 
Its Profits,” which initially appeared in the New York Times Magazine on September 13, 
1970, but which has subsequently been reprinted in a wide variety of sources.
47  
Interestingly, while it was published in the popular press as a “news” article, it addresses, 
and is tenable to, both scholars and practitioners.  It remains the leading encapsulation of 
the shareholder theory of firm management. 
Friedman denounced discussions of the possible “social responsibilities” of 
business that had become popular by 1970.  Practitioners and scholars had begun to 
explore the depth of managerial responsibilities.  They contended that shareholders were 
not the only relevant parties, and that concerns were not purely financial.  Friedman 
considered this absurd.  First, shareholders, as the owners of the corporation, also own, or 
are entitled to, the corporation’s profits.  The managers of the corporation, working on 
                                                 
45 A legendary “debate” took place in an exchange of law review articles in the early 1930s.  A. A. Berle, 
Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1931); E. M. Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers are Trustees:  A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365. 
46 M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 13, 
1970, 1970). 
47 Id. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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their behalf, as agents, are morally obliged to protect and pursue the interests of the 
owner-shareholders.  According to Friedman, the interests of the shareholders are 
financial, so the obligation of managers must involve profit maximization.  Second, 
Friedman argued that voluntary contractual relationships between productive 
constituents, such as employees, managers, customers, suppliers, and the local 
government, underlie corporate affairs.  Each constituent is rewarded (paid) according to 
terms freely agreed upon.  It is therefore implicit in this network of contractual 
arrangements that the profits are to be to supplied to the shareholders, just as products 
and services are supplied to customers, paychecks are supplied to employees, and so on. 
In his article, Friedman questioned how “business,” an inanimate object, can have 
responsibilities at all.
48  Further, since managers are employed by the shareholder-owners 
of businesses, their responsibilities must be to the owners.  And since shareholder-owners 
invest in business to earn profits, the managers’ responsibilities must translate into the 
maximization of those profits.  The responsibility of managers, as agents appointed by 
business owners is, according to Friedman, “to conduct business in accordance with their 
[shareholders’] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.”
49   
Friedman acknowledged the temptation to attend to other concerns, “social 
responsibilities,” but contended that such courses of action inevitably end up eroding 
corporate profits and therefore impinge upon the managers’ primary responsibility to 
                                                 
48 Friedman is clearly not alone is this thinking.  An entire body of literature within business ethics 
addresses this very point in the discussion surrounding the moral status of the corporation. 
49 Friedman, supra note 46. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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shareholders.  In addition, Friedman argued that managers motivated by social 
responsibility end up spending other people’s money toward inappropriate ends.  For 
example, to refrain from increasing the price of a product in order to help keep down 
inflation translates into lower profits for shareholders.  While keeping inflation down is 
arguably a noble goal, it does not make it the place of managers to take steps that might 
contribute toward such a goal at the expense of shareholder profits. 
Interestingly, Friedman suggested that “social responsibility” is sometimes merely 
a “cloak” offered for legitimate business decisions.  For example, a manager’s decision to 
invest in a community (such as to offer education for potential employees) in order to 
provide for the long-term success of the business is easily justified, according to 
Friedman, on grounds other than actual “social responsibility.”  He suggested that 
references to “social responsibility,” with regard to such decisions, translate into mere 
“window-dressing.”
50  In no way do they suggest that there is a place for managers to be 
motivated by “social responsibilities.” 
Friedman concluded by underscoring the major thrust of his argument, regarding 
shareholder primacy—that managers are, first and foremost, responsible for generating 
corporate profits.  “[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business,” he 
asserts, “to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free 
competition without deception or fraud.”
51 
Although Friedman articulated a strong argument regarding the importance of 
attending to shareholder concerns, he nevertheless failed to stifle efforts in support of 
                                                 
50 Id. 
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corporate social responsibilities in scholarship or in practice.  Part of the reason for this is 
that he did not account for the interconnected stakeholder relationships that underlie 
business enterprises and must be recognized and managed for sustainable success. 
 
PART II:  STAKEHOLDER THINKING     
In spite of Friedman’s argument, the role of the manager and the place of the 
corporation in its larger social and communal context continues to be questioned.  
Stakeholder thinking provides one vehicle through which social responsibilities are 
recognized and shareholder primacy as a guiding principle is challenged. 
Stakeholder thinking was initially recognized by the business ethicists in the mid-
1980s; it has since become a model upon which many businesspeople rely.  It signifies 
the recognition that the corporation has responsibilities to people or entities in addition to 
shareholders.  Although there are different types of stakeholder “theories” within the 
general stakeholder thinking “genre,” the basic shared premise is that there are numerous 
people or entities that have “stakes” in the affairs of the firm—that affect or are affected 
by firm decisions—and that they, therefore, have some sort of rights and responsibilities 
vis-à-vis their stakeholder relationships with firms and each other.  Stakeholder theories 
thus identify these people or entities (e.g., the firm, managers, employees, customers, 
suppliers, communities) and explore the normative relationships between them. 
 
A.  Traditional Stakeholder Thinking 
In 1984, in Strategic Management:  A Stakeholder Approach, Freeman challenged 
traditional principles of management by suggesting that shareholder interests should not William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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be treated as supreme, but should instead be considered as part of a broader web of 
stakeholder interests.  According to Freeman, firms have equivalent moral responsibilities 
to stakeholders in general (individuals or entities who affect or are affected by firm 
operations).  Although Freeman was neither the first person to coin the term 
“stakeholder” nor the only opponent of shareholder primacy, he served as a catalyst for 
increased and ongoing dialogue and debate regarding managerial responsibilities. 
 
The stakeholder concept did not emerge in a vacuum.  Even before the word 
“stakeholder” began to appear in the popular press or scholarly literature, there was 
considerable conversation about and support for the idea that a corporation has 
obligations beyond its traditionally-accepted fiduciary obligations to shareholders.
52  
Once the term gained popularity, scholars began applying the stakeholder model to a 
wide range of situations.  Indeed, it has become the primary model for corporate social 
responsibility and its potential is still being explored. 
                                                 
52 The fiduciary obligation of managers to shareholders reflects traditional understanding of business.  In 
American law it is contained in the legally protected and enforced “duty of care.” 
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The original stakeholder model proposed was a hub-and-spoke model, which 
placed the firm in the center of a set of bilateral relationships.  In this way, the firm was 
transformed from an entity on paper into a multidimensional enterprise whose activities 
had tangible consequences. 
Stakeholder thinking generally aims to dispel a few common misunderstandings.  
The first common misunderstanding that stakeholder thinking attacks is that shareholders 
are the only legitimate claimholders, or stakeholders.  This fallacy encompasses the 
traditional assumption that a financial investment (e.g., through stock ownership) is 
necessary to ground a claim on the firm.  On the contrary, evidence suggests that 
individuals and entities other than shareholders have legitimate claims on the firm.  
Employees, customers, suppliers, the community, and so on, all have legitimate claims as 
a result of their relationship with the firm.  Employees, for example, invest in firms 
through labor, commitment, and loyalty.  Stakeholder thinking thus establishes the 
presence of multiple legitimate stakeholders. 
Stakeholder thinking also dispels the common misunderstanding that shareholders 
and their interests are primary.  Traditional fiduciary law and corporate law identify 
shareholder interests.  It is true that managers are barred from behaving in fiscally 
irresponsible manners, so as to interfere wrongfully with firm profitability and 
shareholder returns, but this is not to say that these are the manager’s only concerns.  
Managers have overriding responsibilities to other stakeholders, many of which are 
codified in federal and state legislation, which define and assert a number of non-
shareholder stakeholder concerns, and protect them from managers willing to pursue pure 
profit maximization at the expense of non-shareholder stakeholders.  For example, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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consumer protection laws, labor and safety laws, and environmental laws offer protection 
to a host of stakeholders.  Indeed, extensive legislation actually prioritizes the interests of 
non-shareholder-stakeholders and demonstrates that shareholder interests are not 
inherently primary.  Shareholder-stakeholder and non-shareholder-stakeholder concerns 
are both treated as significant, with neither given inherent preference. 
Finally, stakeholder thinking is now moving toward recognition of the complexity 
of the stakeholder network.  While early versions of the stakeholder model depict 
bilateral relationships, it is important to recognize that stakeholder relationships are not 
only bilateral.  In actuality, stakeholder relationships are networked and interrelated.  
Stakeholders have relationships with one another, as well as with the firm, and these 
relationships affect one another.  Firms, for example, have bilateral relationships with 
suppliers, employees, communities, and so on.  As it turns out, while it is useful initially 
to view the core bilateral relationships, they do not tell the whole story, because of the 
interconnectedness of the multiple, overlapping stakeholder relationships. 
 
B.  Stakeholder Relationships 
Stakeholder thinking underscores the lack of integration of business and law, for, 
while it addresses business operations, it does so with little attention being paid to the 
role of law.
53  Underlying legal principles and legislation are assumed, but their 
consequences—particularly regarding stakeholder relationships—are rarely explored.
54  
                                                 
53 For instance, see Donaldson and Preston, supra note 3.  Although Donaldson and Preston do not explore 
the ramifications of legislation on stakeholder thinking in detail, they do take note of relevant changes in 
the legal landscape. 
54 Although stakeholder relationships have been mentioned previously, there has been insufficient 
development of their importance with regard to the development of stakeholder management.  C. L. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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In spite of the occasional vague references, such as to “requirements of law,”
55 there have 
been few efforts aimed at exploring in depth the relationship between stakeholder 
thinking and its legal context, particularly with regard to how the law supports attention 
to stakeholders.
56 
The lens of the stakeholder model offers a useful vehicle for viewing firms in 
order to understand better the range of responsibilities firms have to others.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bendheim, S. A. Waddock and S. B. Graves, Determining Best Practices in Corporate-Stakeholder 
Relations Using Data Envelopment Analysis:  An Industry-Level Study, 37 Bus. & Soc’y 305 (1998). 
55 See, for example, A. B. Carroll and J. Nasi, Understanding Stakeholder Thinking: Themes from a Finnish 
Conference, 6 Bus. Ethics: Eur. Rev. 46 (1997).  “This interest or stake might be manifested as a legal or 
moral claim on the organization.  Legal stakes are established by the accepted legal system extant in a 
country” (72).  See also A. B. Carroll, Business and Society:  Ethics and Stakeholder Management (1993).  
“This right might be a legal right to certain treatment rather than a legal claim of ownership such as that of 
a shareholder.  Legal rights might include the right of due process (to get an impartial hearing) or the right 
to privacy (not to have his or her privacy invaded or abridged).  The right might be thought of as a moral 
right, such as that expressed by an employee” (60).  In addition, see M. B. E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder 
Framework for Analysing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 92 (1995).  
“When there is no such legislation or regulation, an issue may be a stakeholder issue, but it is not 
necessarily a social issue.  A test of whether an issue has become a social issue is the presence or absence 
of legislation or regulation” (103). 
56 But see E. W. Orts, A North American Legal Perspective on Stakeholder Management Theory, in 
Perspectives on Company Law (E. W. Orts ed., ed. 1997).  See also R. Marens and A. Wicks, Getting Real:  
Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice, and the General Irrelevance of Fiduciary Duties Owed to 
Shareholders, 9 Bus. Ethics Q. 273 (1999).  Orts, among a handful others, has addressed the relationships 
between stakeholder thinking and the law.  More recently, Marens and Wicks have argued that standing 
legal principles, case precedent, and legislation do not inherently preempt stakeholder thinking.  They also 
suggest that support for stakeholder thinking can be found in the law. 
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The reality is that the firm is not in the center of all pertinent relationships, and that 
relationships are not merely bilateral.  In fact, the relationships that emerge out of firm 
operations are more accurately described as an interconnected web of relationships.  A 
network model is thus more useful as a model, particularly when advancing principles of 
corporate citizenship.  In such a model, the firm is itself a stakeholder of firm operations, 
and the firm stands opposite its stakeholders in relationships, just as they are in 
relationships with one another.  It is the intermingling of all of these overlapping 
relationships that constitutes the operations of the firm. 
 
C.  Stakeholder Thinking vs. the Law 
Until recently, stakeholder thinking has developed with only nominal reference to 
the legal environment in which businesses operate.
57  This is largely the result of 
traditional interpretations of fiduciary law and shareholder primacy, which ostensibly 
preclude attention to non-shareholder stakeholder concerns.  This is starting to change, 
though.  Although the structuring of corporate relationships, specifically with regard to 
shareholders and managers, has not officially been altered, managers, through skillful 
decision-making, have demonstrated that they can simultaneously attend to the concerns 
of both shareholders and other stakeholders.  This is important, because managers are 
human beings, and, as such, they have natural moral inclinations.  While the corporate 
entity is arguably fictitious, its effects on stakeholders are real.  Although laws do not 
always coincide with our moral principles, they should leave room for us to adhere to our 
moral principles within the context of the law. 
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An interesting phenomenon occurred during the 1980s as we witnessed a subtle 
shift in legal thinking.  Within a short period of time, more than half the states in the 
United States adopted so-called “constituency statutes.”
58  These statutes—drafted in 
virtually identical language—expressly permit managers to consider the interests of 
certain “constituents” (stakeholders) during certain situations.  Numerous scholars, both 
business and legal, have speculated about the influence of constituency statutes.  
Foremost among the legal scholars to recognize the relevance of this phenomenon was 
Eric Orts.  He traced the stockholder/stakeholder controversy back to the Berle/Dodd 
debate of the early 1900s, which was only temporarily reconciled.
59  A number of 
scholars initially viewed constituency statutes as holding the potential for change in 
corporate practices.
60  While this may be true, such expectations have yet to be realized.  
In fact, the existence of such statutes has proved extremely controversial.
61 
  Constituency statutes are arguably less important than what they represent, that is, 
a shift in legal thinking toward recognition that managerial decision-making governed 
solely by shareholder concerns is overly myopic.  For example, if managers make 
                                                 
58 M. Kelly, Laws Require Directors to Take Wider View on Takeover Offers, Star Tribune, Nov. 27, 
1995).  See E. W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders:  Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 14 (1992); T. L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes:  A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. 
& Com. 257 (1995); J. Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency:  Asking the Wrong 
Question, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 425 (1990); J. J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire:  Nonshareholder Constituency 
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 97 (1991); K. V. W. Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under 
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 45 . 
59 Berle, supra note 45; Dodd, supra note 45. 
60 See R. M. Hart and C. M. Degener, Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, N.Y.L.J., April 12, 1990).  
But see M. P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. Law. 461 (1992); L. E. Mitchell, A 
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579 
(1992); R. S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1156-1176 (1993). 
61 See, for example, L. J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders:  Evaluating Corporate Constituency 
Statutes Under the Takings Clause, 24 Iowa J. Corp. L. 1 (1998); S. M. Bainbridge, Interpreting 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 971 (1992); W. W. Bratton, Confronting the 
Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1449 (1993); G. v. 
Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:  Legend or Lie?, 11 Hofstra Lab. 
L.J. 461 (1994); C. Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes:  A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. Law. 1355 
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promises to employees regarding long term employment, it is arguably morally wrong to 
break those promises in the interests of shareholders by allowing mass layoffs or a 
takeover that causes layoffs.  In some states, this would actually constitute actionable 
harm to the employees.  In fact, courts in many states are increasingly recognizing rights 
of employees linked to their reliance on workplace guarantees.
62 
The emergence of constituency statutes has provoked questioning of the disparity 
between how laws regulate business and how businesses actually operate.
63  While 
corporate laws do not protect non-shareholder stakeholders in general, the fact of the 
matter is that businesspeople generally do.  It tends to be assumed that good managers 
consider stakeholder relationships in their short- and long-term decision-making, even 
though corporate law does not demand that they do so. 
In addition, it is important to keep in mind the conscious steps taken to protect 
stakeholders through the passing of specific legislation (e.g., environmental protection 
laws, consumer protection laws, employment laws, security laws, and so on).  Such 
legislation plays an integral role in shaping the environment in which stakeholder 
relationships exist.  Legislation often serves to bolster stakeholder claims, and it serves to 
trump shareholder primacy as a guiding principle in the situations where it operates.  
Indeed, various pieces of state and federal legislation actually create, sustain, and 
maintain many vital business-related operations and stakeholder relationships. 
Further, it is essential to keep in mind the global nature of business.  While each 
country is governed by its own laws, there are perceivable trends and countries often 
                                                 
62 [Werhane, 2003 [forthcoming] #143].  See Chapters 2 and 3 regarding exceptions to employment at will.  
See also T. J. Radin and P. H. Werhane, The Public/Private Distinction and the Political Status of 
Employment, 34 Am. Bus. L.J. 245 (1996). 
63 D. G. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 277 (1998).  See also Donaldson and 
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model legislation after one another.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example, 
long considered an anomaly, is now serving as a model for international legislation also 
directed toward the fight against corruption.  It is also important to recognize that the 
American model is not necessarily the dominant model overseas, particularly in Europe 
and Asia, where non-shareholder stakeholders are specifically recognized.
64 
Corporate law is merely one legal vehicle through which corporations and 
stakeholders are regulated.  Examination of other bodies of law, such as federal and state 
legislation, as well as the Constitution as it has been found to relate to corporations, 
reveals that shareholder interests and fiduciary responsibilities are not the only concerns 
that managers are required to consider.  While corporate law might appear to show 
preference to shareholders, American law as a whole is consistent in many ways with 
stakeholder thinking. 
 
PART III:  STAKEHOLDER THINKING AND LAW:  BRIDGING THE GAP 
Shareholder primacy is no longer either a satisfying answer or an insurmountable 
obstacle to the challenges of managerial decision-making.  The reality is that not all 
managerial decisions are about bottom line profitability.  In addition, managerial 
decisions and determinations are not clear-cut, in either the short or long term.  Indeed, 
many decisions involve investments in relationships that pay off only over time.   
Corporations clearly serve societal roles beyond pure shareholder wealth-
maximization, with the tempered support of both legislators and jurists.  State and federal 
                                                 
64 But see, regarding alternative approaches abroad, A. F. Conrad, Corporate Constituencies in Western 
Europe, 21 Stetson L. Rev. 73 (1991).  See also A. A. Sommer, Jr., Defining the Corporate Constituency:  
Corporate Governance in the Nineties:  Managers vs. Institutions, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 357 (1995). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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legislation identifies and affords protection for competing concerns, and judges often 
sanction unconventional corporate activities, as long as they cannot be construed as 
causing direct interference with shareholder profits, by deferring to managerial discretion.  
The legal environment of business enterprises is not as unfriendly to stakeholder thinking 
as is frequently assumed. 
 
A.  History Revisited 
In many ways it is somewhat ironic that traditional interpretations of the 
corporation treat it as an individual-based profit-making enterprise, for the corporate form 
was originally created as a contributor to the community.  The purpose of most of the 
early corporations (at least through the middle of the 19
th century) reinforced the image 
of the corporation as “artificial.”
65  Few of the early firms were incorporated for purely 
private business objectives.  On the contrary, early corporations tended to serve public 
roles.  Many were charitable and municipal enterprises, others were privately-owned 
banking, insurance, and public utility entities.
66  In other words, like the legal system, 
early corporations tended to promote the general public welfare.  The pursuit of 
incorporation for private, profit-making, purposes was initially viewed with suspicion.  
During the mid-1800s, there was fear that the presence of corporations threatened the 
economic balance of power.
67  Such concerns thus contributed to the passing of general 
incorporation statutes, which, in term, made incorporation more accessible and made 
them seem less discriminatory. 
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66 Hurst, supra note 13. 
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The gradual emergence of corporations as for profit enterprises caused the courts 
to determine what constitutes fair business practices.  As the courts wrestled with what 
constitutes fair business practices, the court in 1909 confronted a situation where 
someone went into business in order to put someone else out of business.
68  The court 
held that this does not constitute a proper business purpose: 
 
Men cannot always, in civilized society, be allowed to use 
their own property as their interests or desires may dictate 
without reference to the fact that they have neighbors 
whose rights are as sacred as their own. The existence and 
well-being of society require that each and every person 
shall conduct himself consistently with the fact that he is a 
social and reasonable person. The purpose for which a man 
is using his own property may thus sometimes determine 
his rights.
 69 
 
In other words, there is the expectation that business enterprises will reflect profit-
generation as a goal.  At the same time, the court also recognized the connectedness of 
business enterprises to other stakeholders, such as the community, and held that it was 
wrong for the community to be left without a service being provided as a result of unfair 
competition.  While stakeholders are not given general rights within business enterprises, 
jurisprudence nevertheless reflects an implicit understanding that their concerns will not 
be completely ignored. 
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B.  Rethinking Fiduciary Law 
Current scholarship indicates that fiduciary law is not necessarily the “linchpin” 
of corporate law.
70  At the very least, it has been misinterpreted and applied more broadly 
than is warranted.  According to Richard Marens and Andrew Wicks, fiduciary law does 
not inherently exclude attention to stakeholders other than shareholders.  As Marens and 
Wicks accurately pointed out, the roots of the term go back to times when managerial 
indiscretion was feared.  It is rooted, therefore, in an attempt to prevent managers from 
self-dealing, more than in an effort to distinguish between stakeholders and preclude 
attention to non-shareholder stakeholder considerations. 
In addition, as Marens and Wicks explained, fiduciary duty is no longer only 
between managers and shareholders.  In 1996, the Supreme Court in Varity v. Howe held 
that a corporation had breached its fiduciary duty to employees as a result of a fiscally 
irresponsible reorganization.
71  While, to date, this remains a somewhat isolated instance, 
it reflects changing attitudes.  There is growing recognition that firms and their managers 
have a broader range of obligations than anticipated by fiduciary law as applied to 
shareholders. 
The presence of fiduciary relationships does not preclude the existence of other 
stakeholder relationships.  Focusing on shareholders, at the expense of other stakeholders, 
ignores the potential financial consequences of those relationships.  It can be argued that, 
in order to fulfill fiduciary obligations in the interests of shareholder profitability, 
stakeholder relationships must be taken into account. 
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C.  Corporate Personhood 
“The ‘corporation,’ itself is born, lives and dies all by and upon paper,” asserted 
Dean Edwin R. Latty.  “What is wanted, then, is a statutory chart-blueprint to tell the 
decision-makers what they can do and how to do it—anything from a stock option to a 
merger.”
72  While state corporate codes continue to treat corporations as fictitious 
entities, other areas of the law (particularly federal law) recognize corporations as legal 
persons with protected legal rights.  Legal “personhood” has emerged, for the most part, 
during this century.  Courts have gradually carved out specific rights and responsibilities 
to be attributed to and enforced for the corporation as a separate entity.   
“Personhood,” in American law, is not restricted to humans.  While it is not 
officially limited by factors such as race, religion, or gender, personhood, at least 
according to American law, is limited by age.  Minors (people under 18 years of age) are 
not considered responsible for their actions, in most instances—their parents (or 
guardians) are considered accountable for their behavior.  This is generally the case, 
though there are exceptions.  For example, some older minors are sentenced and punished 
as adults for serious criminal offenses.  Minors, for example, are not bound by promises 
they make (i.e., purchases).  In addition, personhood is also limited by mental capacity.  
The American legal system provides a criminal defense for insanity.  In theory, at least, 
mentally handicapped people are not able to conduct adequate moral reasoning, and, 
therefore, they cannot be punished as if they were.  This is not to suggest that the 
American legal system necessarily handles diminished capacity properly, but that is 
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another issue.  What is relevant here is that American law does at least acknowledge the 
relationship between mental capacity and moral culpability. 
While the legal and moral spheres intersect at places, they are not the same.  
Numerous legal regulations concern activities that, while they might not be socially 
productive or constructive, are not inherently immoral.  According or protecting legal 
rights and responsibilities is, therefore, not necessarily linked to moral rights and 
responsibilities (though there is often some sort of relationship).  The law is, arguably, a 
pragmatic guide or tool, while morality is about “right” or “good” behavior.  The law 
does not necessarily aim at (traditionally understood) fairness, but at predictability and 
practicality.  Contractual disputes, for example, are often not adjudicated according to 
who deserves the penalty or additional cost, but according to who can bear it more 
easily.
73 
It is the American legal system that identifies the corporation as a “legal” person, 
though admittedly “fictitious.”  Treating corporations as legal “persons” thus allows the 
legal system to enforce rights and responsibilities for the corporation.  In other words, the 
“corporation,” as a legal “person,” has become a “stakeholder,” in and of itself. 
The duplicity of the corporation, as a stakeholder with its own concerns and as the 
intersection of multiple relationships between stakeholders with their own separate 
concerns, is underscored by the treatment of corporations by jurists.  In deciding the cases 
that come before them, courts first determine whether a corporation is acting as legal 
person or is serving as mere umbrella for other stakeholders’ behavior. 
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Basically, a legal person is someone (or something) subject to legal provisions.  
What is interesting is that a corporation can be considered a legal person with regard to 
some provisions, and not with regard to others.  Although legal personhood is distinct 
from moral personhood, the considerations that go into determining whether a 
corporation is a moral person are relevant with regard to the determination of whether a 
corporation is a legal person.
74 
                                                 
74 Identifying the corporation as a legal person does not indicate that it merits moral personhood as well.  In 
fact, this is a topic that has been debated extensively.  P. A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 
Am. Phil. Q. 207 (1979); M. G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything 
They Do, 2 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 1 (1983).  Among the more persuasive arguments is that proposed by 
Patricia H. Werhane, that corporations are not moral persons, but are “secondary moral agents.”  P. H. 
Werhane, Persons, Rights, and Corporations (1985). 
PROVISION NATURE  RESULT 
Art. I, @ 10, cl. 
1 
Impairment of 
Contracts 
Corporations are protected. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1810). 
Art. III, @ 2, cl. 
1 
Diversity of 
Citizenship 
Jurisdiction 
Even though the corporation is an “artificial” person, it is 
considered a citizen of the state where it is incorporated or 
presumed to have citizenship.  Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R.R., 
57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853); Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 
43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 557-58 (1844). 
Art. IV, @ 2  Privileges and 
Immunities 
Corporations are not protected.  Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 
U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839). 
1st Amendment  Freedom of 
Speech 
Corporate speech is protected, although the corporation as 
speaker is not.  First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1968). 
4th Amendment  Unreasonable 
Searches and 
Seizures 
Corporations are protected.  Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. 
Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 
(1906). 
5th Amendment  self-incrimination  Corporations are not protected. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 
85 (1974); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
5th Amendment  Double Jeopardy  Corporations are not protected.  United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). 
5th and 14th 
Amendments 
Due Process  Corporations are protected.  Grosjean v. American Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. 
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889). 
5th and 14th 
Amendments 
Equal Protection 
of the Laws 
Corporations are protected.  Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & 
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888); Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1986). 
14th 
Amendment 
Privileges and 
Immunities 
Corporations are not protected. States v. Hague, 307 U.S. 496, 
514 (1939); Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 
(1907). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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Jurists have confronted numerous questions regarding the applicability of 
constitutional provisions to corporations.  In many instances, the courts have found that 
corporations are included among the legal persons intended to be protected (the court has 
already confronted a host of questions concerning the Constitutional status of the 
corporation).  Rights and responsibilities attributed to corporations tend to correspond to 
the constitutional protections afforded to human persons.  Corporations are not 
guaranteed protection as human persons, but they are afforded protection similar to 
human persons.   
For example, courts have extended protection to corporations for behavior 
encompassed by the 1
st, 4
th, 5
th, and 14
th Amendments.  The due process rights of 
corporations have been protected, as have been their rights to freedom from illegal 
searches and seizures.  In addition, courts have determined that corporations have 
citizenship, even though they are not biological individuals.  Where courts have refused 
to recognize the rights of corporations, it is regarding provisions such as double jeopardy 
and self-incrimination, where it would serve injustice, not justice, to treat corporations as 
legal persons.  As persons, corporations are more than profit-making enterprises. 
 
D.  Allowances in the Law for Corporate Responsibilities 
Most of the dialogue surrounding stakeholders and the law refers to the rights of 
stakeholders—i.e., protecting them from harm.  On the other side, there is also the 
perspective of the corporation’s ability to make contributions for their benefit.  Such 
contributions often take the form of corporate giving, also known as corporate 
philanthropy.  Interestingly, a legal justification for corporate donations has been William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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developed, which dates back to the 1930s.  The institution of financial incentives (such as 
tax breaks) have provided a business-related purpose, and the First Amendment has been 
interpreted as empowering corporations to make corporate gifts.
75 
The purpose here is not to argue against corporate giving, which is the subject of 
much debate,
76 but to suggest that there are broader ramifications.  If managers are 
allowed to funnel corporate funds into causes they deem appropriate, then it should also 
be appropriate for them to make similar decisions regarding other stakeholders—not just 
the recipients of gifts.  It only makes sense that, within the context of permissible 
corporate giving, that managers not only be allowed but be expected to consider the array 
of stakeholders interests that affect and are affected by the operations of business 
enterprises. 
Further, it is essential to keep in mind that stakeholders both affect and are 
affected by business enterprises.  It can be argued that corporate giving enables firms to 
invest in stakeholders to provide for future returns.  Corporate giving to causes such as 
arts and education programs, for example, help to enrich the community in which firms 
operate.  This can lead to a stronger potential workforce from which to draw.  This is 
only one example.  The broader message is that corporate philanthropy, as a legally 
allowable choice for managers, indicates that the law is not antithetical to stakeholder 
thinking.  
                                                 
75 For an overview, see H. W. Smith, If Not Corporate Philanthropy, Then What?, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 
757 (1997). 
76 See, for example, V. Brudney and A. Ferrell, Corporate Speech and Citizenship:  Corporate Charitable 
Giving, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1191 (2002); J. L. Himmelstein, Looking Good and Doing Good:  Corporate 
Philanthropy and Corporate Power (1997); J. E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy from a Corporate 
Governance Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1091 (1997); M. A. Eisenberg, Legal Conduct, Ethical 
Conduct, The Penumbra Effect, Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, 
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E.  Stakeholder Thinking and the Law 
The reality is that stakeholder thinking does not conflict with the law as much as 
it can appear at first blush.  First, there are short and long term consequences of decision-
making.
77  Ignoring stakeholder concerns might not affect short-term performance, but it 
can have a serious negative impact on long-term performance.  If we have not learned 
anything else from the experiences of such companies as Enron, Arthur Andersen, and, 
more recently, WorldCom, we should have learned that life catches up to you.
78  This is 
true for individuals, organizations, and society at large. 
Second, life is complex.
79  This is what has often been overlooked during much of 
the traditional debate, which has focused on shareholders and other stakeholders as 
individuals or groups of individuals with regard for combined effects of their interaction.  
Complicated networks of stakeholder relationships underlie business enterprises and 
influence their performance.  In addition, contrary to Freeman’s original hub-and-spoke 
model, the firm is not in the center of all of those relationships.
80  Perhaps if the firm 
were, then shareholder primacy might make sense, but the reality is that numerous 
                                                 
77 L. T. Hosmer, Moral Leadership in Business (1994). 
78 For a discussion of the impact of the Enron situation, see J. N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the 
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:  Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1233 (2002).  According to Gordon, “The Enron matter will prove to be a very important event in the 
history of American shareholder capitalism.  Many of the important institutions were subjected to a stress 
test at a particular firm and the outcome was poor….  But Enron also reminds us that there is a problem that 
cannot be solved, but can only be contained, in the tension between imperfectly fashioned incentives and 
self-restraint.”  Id. at 1249-50.  See also K. Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive 
Social Movements, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1227 (2002); L. P. Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate 
Law Professors, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1483 (2002); R. Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility:  Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for 
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1531 (2002); F. S. Kahn, Bombing Markets, 
Subverting the Rule of Law:  Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1579 
(2002). 
79 A growing number of business scholars have started drawing upon scientific thinking, in domains such as 
physics (chaos theory), in order to emphasize the inherently complexity in life and business so as to train 
business practitioners to manage this complexity in order to use it to their advantage.  See, for example, M. 
J. Wheatley, Leadership and the New Science (1992). 
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stakeholder relationships exist that affect operations over which the firm does not have 
control.  Stakeholder thinking therefore enables business enterprises to remain dynamic.  
Paying attention only to shareholders limits the ability of managers to counter 
relationships that threaten its performance, and to recognize and develop relationships 
that can protect the firm over the long term. 
Third, the law keeps itself in check.  Corporate law is not the only legal constraint 
on managerial behavior.  The presence of other checks and balances—such as the 
Constitution, judicial decisions, and state and federal legislation—indicates that 
managers’ fiduciary responsibilities encompass protecting shareholder interests within 
the context of the broader legal environment. 
Fourth, the law is dynamic.  Changes take place, both through legislation and 
judicial interpretation, within our legal environment.  While the foundational principles 
tend to remain constant, the interpretation and application of the law is an ongoing 
process, particularly as unanticipated events occurred.  Take, for example, 
whistleblowing.  The doctrine of employment-at-will does not anticipate the problems an 
employee will confront when he or she reports illegal activities taking place in the 
workplace.  Judges and legislatures have thus intervened in order to provide protection 
for whistleblowers so that they do place their employment in jeopardy by participating in 
the enforcement of the law.  In some instances, the law has to catch with morality.  This 
is what is happening with regard to a number of stakeholders. 
Fifth, human beings are moral beings.  It can be argued that corporate law does 
not demand that managers ignore their moral intuitions.  While managers are specifically 
forbidden from prioritizing their personal interests, it only makes sense that it is to be William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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expected that managers will exercise their moral reasoning as part of their decision-
making.  Managers are hired because of their decision-making abilities—because of their 
skills and abilities and who they are as individuals.
81  To place upon them an intractable 
mandate of a sole guiding principle (shareholder primacy) simply does not make sense.  
If shareholder returns were the only consideration, then there would be a management 
algorithm, not a human manager, at the helm.  The reality is that shareholder concerns are 
a subset of the broader category of concerns that managers must confront, and managers 
distinguish themselves according to their adeptness at balancing these competing 
concerns. 
Sixth, shareholder primacy no longer provides a useful imperative for managers.
82  
General expectations today are such that businesses will consider the concerns of an array 
of stakeholders—such as through fair employment practices, corporate giving to 
communities, and joint ventures among competitors.  Such initiatives tend to address 
stakeholder concerns—they enhance the values of shares as well. 
Bridging the gap between stakeholder thinking and the law is therefore not as 
complicated or imposing an endeavor as it might seem.  On the contrary, through 
inspection of the law as a whole (beyond state-dictated corporate law), respect for 
history, and recognition of ongoing developments within the law, stakeholder thinking 
and the law are in many ways consistent and supportive of one another. 
 
                                                 
81 With regard to people as individuals, or “particularized others,” see S. Benhabib, The Generalized and 
the Concrete Other, in Women and Moral Theory (S. Benhabib ed., ed. 1989); S. Benhabib, Situating the 
Self:  Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (1992). 
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PART IV:  SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The ripple effect of the devastation caused by the tragedy of September 11 has 
extended beyond the perimeter of downtown New York and has affected the lives of a 
wide constellation of stakeholders—not only shareholders and victims.  The events of 
September 11 have also had an impact on employees, competitors, business partners 
(suppliers, distributors, and so on), the environment, and the community in general.  As 
many downtown New York firms endured severe physical and psychological distress, the 
concerted and combined effort of multiple stakeholders vastly aided recovery process 
progressed. 
 
A.  That Day 
The collapse of the towers took with them both lives and businesses.  Global 
investment firm Morgan Stanley occupied roughly a fourth of the floors in the two 
towers.  The towers were also home to such firms as international legal conglomerate 
Sidley Austin Brown and Wood, broker-dealer Cantor Fitzgerald, and Chicago-based 
futures and options trading firm, Carr Futures.  Not all of the firms were American, 
though.  Some 20 Japanese firms had offices in the Twin Towers of the World Trade 
Center.  In addition, the concourses and lobbies of the buildings were lined with shops—
everything from florists and gift shops to Ben and Jerry’s.  As the buildings crumbled, so 
disappeared the livelihoods, hopes, and dreams of thousands of businesspeople, along 
with all of the physical evidence and records that business transactions and negotiations 
had ever taken place there. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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Even businesses not directly hit by the attack forced to remain closed for days and 
weeks even.  Another building in the World Trade Center, #7, which housed the 
investment bank Salomon Smith Barney, collapsed within the day and innumerable other 
offices suffered serious structural damage.  The entire downtown New York landscape 
was permanently altered. 
The tragedy at the World Trade Center was of a unique nature.  It was not the first 
time the towers had been targeted and harmed.  The problem was that, after the first 
bombing, the residents of the World Trade Center had developed a false sense of security, 
in that they were confident that harm could not be brought in through the front door—and 
it was not.  Virtually no one anticipated an attack from outside. 
In building the World Trade Center chief architect, Minoru Yamasaki, led a team 
of 14 architects who designed the buildings to be defensible against being hit by a plane.  
Because of their height, an accident was foreseeable to them.  The buildings were thus 
designed like pipes, so that, were a plane to hit, it would travel through the building 
without bring the building down.  The buildings were built roughly 30 years ago, though, 
when the Boeing 707 was the airplane with which to reckon—nothing of the size and 
impact of the Boeing 757s that tore into the World Trade Centers this September had 
been envisioned.  In addition, no one foresaw the malicious intentionality of such a 
collision with two planes full of fuel.  So, while in theory, the buildings were resistant to 
air attacks, in fact, they were quite vulnerable.  In addition, as the fuel leaked to the cores 
of the buildings, they appeared to implode, and, as they did so, it shook the very 
foundation of buildings within neighboring blocks.  In fact, as a result of the horrific 
catastrophe, including the physical damage as well as the gas leaks and power outages, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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New York south of 14
th Street, including the New York Stock Exchange, was, in an 
unprecedented event, closed for days. 
The picture painted here is one that endeavors to depict some of the incredible, 
almost inconceivable, losses endured by the businesses that had populated lower 
Manhattan, primarily those in the financial district.  It is, though, barely the tip of the 
iceberg.  It was several days before the smoke over downtown New York even began to 
lift.  While businesses are now operating again—many from satellite offices or new 
locations—things are not the same. 
It is important to understand, or at least attempt to determine, the gravity of what 
happened to the people and their lives in order to begin to appreciate the importance of 
understanding the roles of the firms from that day onward.  Records are gone, and people 
are missing, injured, and dead, but the firms still exist—even those without the support of 
home or branch locations.  In fact, the presence and importance of these firms are 
arguably even greater in the wake of the tragedy, for it is now that their citizenship needs 
to be felt by the array of stakeholders who depend upon them. 
In the months following the disaster, we continued to feel the effects of 
September 11.  The American economy is recovering, but people, businesses, 
communities, and countries are still feeling the consequences.  Many people, not just in 
New York, are out of work, and new jobs are not easy to find.  Others are choosing to 
change their jobs.  The firms formerly located in or around the World Trade Center not 
only lost valuable human assets as a result of the bombings, but they are losing additional 
employees who were prompted by the disaster to reconsider their employment choices, 
with regard to location, environment, and firm.  Around the world firms are creating new William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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policies and procedures, and they are forging new sorts of relationships to carry them 
forward. 
 
B.  Stakeholder Concerns 
  Although the notion of businesses as citizens is not new, it has gained momentum 
during the past several years and it is increasingly being viewed as a useful new paradigm 
for business.  The view is that firms, like people, have responsibilities to the people and 
groups of people with whom they are involved.  People have responsibilities based on 
their citizenship, which makes them subject to American laws.  Although business firms 
do not acquire official citizenship, they are subject to American and international laws for 
a number of reasons, such as the process of incorporation.  American and international 
individuals thus share with American and international business firms similar rights and 
responsibilities. 
  While there is an innumerable list of affected parties, the primary stakeholders are 
the firms themselves (and the airlines).
83  These firms wear a number of hats, so to speak, 
in that, while they are firms in and of themselves, they are also inter-networked in 
relationships that position them as neighbors in the World Trade Center, sometime 
competitors partners upon occasion, and peers.
 84  Landlords in downtown New York are 
having trouble filling space.
85  Employers provided psychological counseling for people 
having trouble dealing with what happened.  In addition, it is important to keep in mind 
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the clients/customers, employees, and families/friends of employees.  All of these people 
are directly affected by what has happened. 
With regard to employees, they can be divided into multiple groups.  First, there 
is a line that can be drawn between the employees who were in the building and the 
employees who were not.  Beyond that, there are the employees based in the affected 
office (i.e., World Trade Center) and those that are not (for those businesses with 
multiple offices/branch locations).  In addition, there are former employees, present 
employees, and future employees.  Former employees often own stock or share in the 
pension plan.  They, particularly those who have retired, and not just moved on to 
competitors or the like, also tend to hold an emotional attachment to the firm’s reputation.  
Just as alumnae of schools often feel pride associated with their alma maters, retirees, as 
“alumnae” of firms, often feel similar emotions with regard to the firms where they 
worked. 
The government is clearly another important stakeholder.  If not for the rescue 
personnel dispatched by the government, the number of lost lives might be even greater.  
Regardless, these people risked, and many lost, their lives in order to try to get others to 
safety.  Even though they were not able to prevent the collapse of the buildings, they 
helped get people to safety quickly and expeditiously.  The government is also a 
stakeholder as a target of the incident, as a participant in recovery and restoration efforts, 
and as the moderator of public safety.  Foreign governments are also significant 
stakeholders.  Not only because of the foreign firms and people involved in the tragedy, 
but also because of the shared threat of terrorism. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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  Other firms, such as neighbors, competitors, and partners (i.e., collaborators, 
distributors, and suppliers), were also stakeholders.  They were all affected by what 
happened, and what was to happen, as a result of the tremendous losses felt by the 
business community—particularly the small mom-and-pop stores.  The New York Stock 
Exchange, for example, while not directly hit, was nevertheless forced to close for days.
 86  
This created formidable economic challenges, both nationally and globally.  Indeed, the 
widespread closings and the tremendous impact on people and lifestyle choices, such as 
travel and tourism, had serious, long-term economic ramifications on all businesses. 
  In addition, other charities also suffered in the consequences of September 11.
87  
With no disrespect intended toward the tremendous losses felt, there are other important 
causes, and, as many contributions were redirected toward victims of September 11, other 
charities suffered. 
  What about the children?
88  An ongoing concern involves how to answer the 
questions of children.  What do we want to teach them regarding what has happened, and 
how do we help them recover from the nightmare? 
  Finally, the community as a stakeholder cannot be ignored.
89  The global, national, 
local, and Internet communities were all affected by this tragedy.  In the hours that 
followed the incident, websites emerged and web conversations developed that 
endeavored to reconnect friends and families.  This was an event that touch people 
around the world—it was not isolated its reach. 
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  The complete array of stakeholder obviously encompasses a wider range than 
those listed here.  The tourism industry, and the economy, are also stakeholders, as are 
the Palestinians, both in the Middle East and here.  And, as painful as it is to remember, 
there were pockets of people in the United States, primarily from other countries, who 
took joy in the harm that came to the businesses and people in the World Trade Center.  
While theirs might not be a stake we wish to protect, it is, nevertheless, a stake to 
acknowledge, particularly if attempting to complete a full picture. 
 
C.  Role of Relationships 
In 1984, Freeman identified terrorists as possible stakeholders of organizations, 
and for this he has received considerable criticism.  It is possible to argue that the events 
of September 11 resulted from the reluctance to recognize the impact of business 
enterprises on terrorists.  This is not to suggest that business practices should be 
compromised for the sake of vocal opposition, or that anyone should necessarily give in 
to threats and fear.  Recognizing the effects of decisions on stakeholders empowers 
managers to anticipate and prepare for consequences.  In this instance, recognizing the 
threat of terrorism might have prompted enhanced security measures or broader policy 
recommendations. 
The importance of stakeholder relationships has emerged as a dominant theme, 
particularly in the wake of September 11.  Multiple stakeholder relationship have been 
affected and built upon in order to provide for the recovery of downtown New York and 
the environs.  Relationships between the community (volunteers) and the government, for 
example, have been integral to the rebuilding effort.  These relationships include William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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relationships that involve affected firms as well as relationships among their stakeholders, 
in which they are not directly involved.  It is also mportant to note that many of the 
people involved in these relationships remained anonymous.  People and organizations 
made contributions—often without identifying themselves.  The volunteers in the brigade 
to look for survivors and remains received plentiful food and water, though they were 
rarely told from whom the gifts came.  
A number of firms from all over the world have participated in the relief effort.  
Wall Street firms have collectively organized efforts, even though many are actually 
industry competitors.
90  Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, for example, a Philadelphia law firm, 
provided web support and collected donations for Cantor Fitzgerald, a client.
91  Many 
firms have contributed money to charities who have then redistributed the funds among 
victims.
92  Others offered office space, personnel, and supplies. 
New York still suffers, and the affected, as well as the contributors to the recovery 
effort, continue to outnumber the direct victims.  Michael Bloomberg, the Mayor of New 
York, has recently announced a plan to spread the tax burden among non-residents who 
work in Manhattan. 
  A number of individuals, firms, communities, and countries are contributing to 
the recovery effort—not all of whom are directly involved.  Interestingly, a lot of 
decisions made were done so purely out of respect.  Newsday, for example, a Long 
Island-based daily newspaper, voluntarily chose to refuse ads from funeral parlors in the 
                                                 
90 E. Copulsky, Helping Hands:  Wall St. Chips in to Care for its Own, N.Y. Post, September 15, 2001. 
91 J. Blumenthal, Phila. Firms Helping With Relief Efforts:  Economy a Looming Concern, Phila. Firms 
Helping With Relief Efforts:  Economy a Looming Concern, September 19, 2001. 
92 A. Kannapell, Keepers (and Disbursers) of the Country’s Sudden Generosity, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 
2001. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
 
48 
 
days following September 11, out of respect for the victims—Newsday did not want to 
take advantage of the tremendous losses. 
In addition, September 11 was an international event, to say the least.  Even so, it 
will still be months and years before downtown New York even starts to show signs of 
recovery.  It is amazing to note the high levels of voluntary contributions, by individuals 
and groups, toward this effort. Separate relationships among a variety of stakeholders are 
what has enabled recovery to progress, and these relationships provide the link to 
sustainable peace. 
 
PART V:  BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, STAKEHOLDERS, AND CORPORATE 
CITIZENSHIP 
The past several years have witnessed a trend in stakeholder thinking toward 
emphasizing the stakeholder relationships that influence businesses and communities, not 
only on a local or national level, but also on a truly global scale.  The events surrounding 
the World Trade Center—those that led up to its destruction, as well as everything that 
has occurred since—emphasize the significance of relationships.  In light of the 
increasing globalization of business, it is now incumbent upon managers to consider the 
international possibilities and effects of their activities. 
  It is important during this time to keep in mind that, while the magnitude of what 
has happened is arguably much larger than anything we have previously experienced, we 
do have models that can assist us in our thinking about business moving forward.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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Numerous businesses, such as Malden Mills, for example, have gone through tragedies.
93  
It is, therefore, important that we build relationships, not just between the stakeholders of 
the World Trade Center, but between what we are experiencing now and what has 
happened before.  An underlying goal of this paper is thus to link our developing notion 
of international business citizenship with past and future business practices, so that we 
can appeal not just to scholarly ideals but to actual business decisions and business role 
models in the development of a theoretical model. 
 
A.   Malden Mills
94 
On December 11, 1995, a fire occurred at Malden Mills, a textile manufacturing 
plant in Lawrence, Massachusetts.  The losses were tremendous.  Three buildings were 
destroyed, 36 workers were injured, and the jobs of 3,000 employees were put in 
jeopardy in a small town that would not easily be able to absorb such a consequence. 
CEO Aaron Feuerstein had a strong prior reputation in the community.  
Feuerstein had endeavored to support and save local businesses, had contributed toward 
the education of community members, and had generally improved life in the community.  
He had even extended lines of credit to local businesspeople.  In the workplace, the 
employer-employee relationships were characterized by respect and dignity—employees 
felt valued.  When the tables turned and Feuerstein confronted disaster, he had already 
invested in strong relationships with multiple stakeholders 
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When Feurestein responded, he did so through the relationships he had developed.  
He worked with the media to identify his accountability, even though the situation was 
accidentally, and to create transparency—to communicate what had happened to the wide 
array of stakeholders.  He continued to pay workers, even though they did not have 
facilities in which to work. 
At the same time, the stakeholder relationships proved significant.  The Chamber 
of Commerce developed a relationship with employees and other stakeholder through a 
hotline.  In addition, community members united to set up an independent relief fund.  
Customers stood by loyally, and competitors also reportedly offered assistance.  
Feuerstein’s prior investment in stakeholder relationships were instrumental in getting 
Malden Mills through this difficult time. 
 
B.   Other Business Practices 
While the Malden Mills example is one of the more pronounced examples, it is 
not alone.  In times of crises, and in day-to-day affairs, it is not uncommon for business 
enterprises to reach out to stakeholders.  Miller Brewing, for example, has on several 
occasions provided bottled water to communities in need.  Citibank, like many other 
companies, provides volunteer incentives and matching programs for a variety of causes.  
In Indonesia, General Motors employees even helped build houses for flood victims in 
July 2002. 
What this illustrates is that the responses to such occurrences as the fire at Malden 
Mills and the events of September 11 are not out-of-the-ordinary, but actually correspond 
with the moral inclinations of stakeholders in any number of situations.  The reality is William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
 
51 
 
that members of business enterprises recognize their connectedness to one another and 
other stakeholders, and they make regular contributions as they develop various 
relationships. 
 
C.   Contributions to Corporate Citizenship 
The situation that has resulted in the wake of the bombing of the World Trade 
Center underscores the interconnectedness of business stakeholders around the world.  
The injured did not have faces to their attackers; they were targets only because they 
were, or were associated with, capitalistic business citizens.  The dead and injured 
participated in the American and international marketplace, and, for that, they were 
punished. 
As terrible as this event has been, it would seem that it also provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to explore, discuss, and determine the essence of corporate 
responsibilities, in crisis and day-to-day situations.  Perhaps we can begin with an 
analysis of the depth of responsibilities in this time of crisis, and use it in order to 
determine responsibilities day-to-day. 
  The situation in September 2001 underscores the need for firms to recognize their 
citizenship and their responsibilities to their stakeholders.  These firms were targets 
because they were business citizens.  They participated in the American marketplace, and 
for that they were punished.  But it is not just the firms who were hurt—stakeholders 
were harmed as well.  It is now for the firms, who have created the relationships and 
allowed their stakeholders to become reliant upon them, to take responsibility for piecing 
things back together. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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Citizenship provides the vehicle for translating stakeholder responsibilities for 
managers.
95  As a citizen, an individual receives benefits and acquires certain 
responsibilities.  Business enterprises, as citizens receive benefits such as tax breaks 
Constitutionally-protected freedoms.  In addition, they receive protection from harm, as 
individuals do, through local fire and police protection agencies.  In return, business 
enterprises have the same sorts of responsibilities that individuals do, such as with regard 
to treating others with respect and to acting responsively.  What the notion of citizenship 
offers stakeholder thinking is a community-based conception of reciprocity.  In other 
words, while stakeholder thinking suggests that firms should pay attention to stakeholders 
because they affect or are affected by the firm’s operations, citizenship more broadly 
indicates that, even if the effects are not clear, responsibilities to stakeholders also exist 
as a result of the membership of the firm in a community in which others are also citizens 
(with similar benefits and responsibilities).
96 
 
D.  Lessons for Managers 
Stakeholder thinking and notions of corporate citizenship play a vital role in 
broadening managerial vision.  There are vital lessons from situations such as September 
11.  In the wake of the catastrophe, we witnessed the best that we can be, as individuals 
and business enterprises.  People wanted to go back to work—not for the salary, 
necessarily, but because they felt natural connections to their peers at work.  After 
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September 11, people held their loved ones close, but the grieved alongside their co-
workers.  In New York, and perhaps elsewhere, people started meeting each other’s eyes 
more often.  It was capitalism that was attacked, but it was human beings who were part 
of the capitalist endeavors. 
Some of the most important lessons involve stakeholder relationships: 
 
1)  Business enterprises cannot exist without stakeholders.  
This creates an inherent interconnectedness. 
2)  Stakeholders affect and are affected by business 
enterprises.  It is important to consider stakeholders who 
are affected by business enterprises because the effects 
can cause them to engage in activities that will then 
affect business enterprises. 
3)  The reliance of stakeholders on business enterprises can 
create the basis for responsibilities.  Many employers 
have assisted families of lost wage earners for this 
reason. 
4)  The business enterprise is not involved in all significant 
relationships.  For example, in the wake of September 
11, many employees sought psychiatric counseling that 
enhanced their work performance.  More broadly, many 
donors contributed to organizations who then distributed 
funds to victims.  In addition, it is essential for business 
enterprises to remain cognizant because they can be 
affected by relationships in which they are not directly 
involved.  Competitors lobbying Congress, for example, 
can have an effect on the operations. 
5)  Shareholders are stakeholders.  Many shareholders are 
also employees, members of the community, and so on.  
Addressing stakeholder concerns encompasses some 
shareholder concerns as well. 
6)  Competitors are stakeholders.  Competition does not 
have to be viewed as competition against one another.  
In the situation involving Malden Mills, for example, 
competitors contributed to the recovery of Malden Mills 
because the industry is made better off by the presence 
of stronger competition—of competitors competing 
together. 
7)  Life is long.  Investments in relationships can pay off in 
the short term, but they hold tremendous potential for 
the future. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 534 
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8)  Life is uncertain.  Because we do not know what will 
happen tomorrow, in terms of either world events or 
business occurrences, the stronger the underlying 
relationships, the better positioned business enterprises 
are to respond to what does happen. 
 
 
It is therefore important, from a business sense, to recognize, manage, and develop 
stakeholder relationships—not only because they are essential in times of crisis, but 
because they are integral to day-to-day operations, whether it is obvious or not. 
  Stakeholder thinking does not offer a formula for management.  It does not 
inherently identify which stakeholders or stakeholder relationships should be prioritized 
or which should be reconciled when they conflict.  The purpose of stakeholder thinking is 
not to provide such a formula, but to expand managerial thinking in order to encompass a 
wider array of concerns.  Managers are hired because of who they are as moral persons.  
Stakeholder thinking emphasizes that managers should be empowered to exercise their 
moral thinking in the workplace.  It therefore helps to reconcile business behavior with 
the natural moral intutions of most people. 
Stakeholder thinking does not inherently conflict with the enterprise goal of profit 
generation.  In fact, stakeholder thinking supports profit generation (which benefits 
shareholders) since it generally benefits multiple stakeholders.  Stakeholder thinking does 
not suggest that profits should be ignored in favor of stakeholder interests.  On the 
contrary, stakeholder thinking merely promotes profit generation through greater 
attention to stakeholder concerns.  Greater long term profitability can often be achieved 
by addressing stakeholder concerns up front. 
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CONCLUSION:  CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
Citizenship does not replace individual responsibility.  This Article contributes to 
an ongoing conversation regarding the roles of stakeholders in organizations.  Since the 
word “stakeholder” first became common in business conversations, debate has existed 
surrounding the existence of moral responsibilities to stakeholders.  My argument is that 
we are individuals first, before we are members of business enterprises, and it is our 
personal responsibilities that can, do, and should shape our consideration of stakeholder 
interests with regard to the business enterprise.  In the wake of September 11, as 
downtown New York was physically and psychologically crippled, it was almost as if 
businesspeople forgot that they were businesspeople, and they reacted as people.  What 
we witnessed during that time, and somewhat since, is the vitality of stakeholder 
relationships.  This is consistent with contemporary thinking regarding best business 
practices.  Business enterprises are increasingly being viewed as systems of relationships 
that are maintained and nurtured in order to enhance organizational success.
97 
Connecting this to sustainable peace, as stakeholder relationships contribute to the 
sustainability of organizations, they can similarly contribute to the sustainability of a 
peaceful society.  Conflict erupts following discontent, and people are discontent when 
they feel disconnected.  The fortification of stakeholder relationship thus translates into a 
step toward sustainable peace.  This allows problems to be addressed on the local level, 
so that they can be prevented from escalating into situations that jeopardize peace.  In 
addition, corporate citizenship emphasizes increased vigilance.  It is not just for 
governments to monitor peace, but for business enterprises to self-police as well.  As 
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members of society, which is how the notion corporate citizenship positions them, they 
have a stake in peace.  
Capitalism has often been painted as immoral, or at least amoral.  On the contrary, 
there are strong arguments that suggest that capitalism can be viewed as having a strong 
moral component.
98  Though ironic, in the wake of September 11, it seems that we 
witnessed the beauty of capitalism, for, when disaster struck, stakeholders, already 
interconnected, developed additional relationships in order to participate in the recovery 
process.  If, instead of abandoning those relationships we build upon them, that is the first 
step toward sustainable peace.  On September 11, capitalism was our Achilles heel—the 
two unprotected towers on the tip of the island.  We can, though, turn capitalism into our 
armor.  By increasing and enhancing our connectedness through stakeholder 
relationships, we can both prevent future attacks and arm ourselves if they do occur. 
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